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Existence and uniqueness result for mean field games with
congestion effect on graphs
Olivier Gue´ant
∗
Abstract
This paper presents a general existence and uniqueness result for mean field games equations
on graphs (G-MFG). In particular, our setting allows to take into account congestion effects of
almost any form. These general congestion effects are particularly relevant in graphs in which the
cost to move from one node to another may for instance depend on the proportion of players in
both the source node and the target node. Existence is proved using a priori estimates and a fixed
point argument a` la Schauder. We propose a new criterion to ensure uniqueness in the case of
Hamiltonian functions with a complex (non-local) structure. This result generalizes the discrete
counterpart of uniqueness results obtained in [31, 33].
Introduction
Mean field games have been introduced in 2006 by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions [30, 31, 32] as the
limit of a large class of stochastic differential games when the number of players increases toward
infinity. Independently and almost simultaneously, Huang et al. [26] proposed a similar framework
for games with a large number of identical players. The idea underlying the introduction of mean
field games is that, in the case of a large number of players, interactions are such that each player
only considers the statistical distribution of the others to make his decisions. From a mathematical
point of view, considering empirical state distributions instead of all the individual states allows to
consider games that were untractable before the introduction of mean field games. In the case of a
finite number M of players, finding a Nash-equilibrium is indeed almost impossible, as it involves
a coupled system of M nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equations. Mean
field games equations however boil down to two coupled equations: a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-
(Bellman) equation for the value function and a forward Kolmogorov transport equation for the
state distribution.
Research on mean field games has developed1 since 2006 and we can divide the literature into
3 parts.
The first and wider part consists in papers on mean field game theory. A lot of papers are
dedicated to proving existence and/or uniqueness for a particular class of mean field games. For
instance, the case of linear-quadratic games has been widely studied by Bardi in [4, 5] and by Ben-
soussan et al. in [7]. Mean field games with quadratic Hamiltonian have been studied by Gue´ant in
[24]. A specific case where closed form solution are exhibited has also been studied in [21]. A priori
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1see [9] and [6] for a general appraisal.
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estimates to prove existence have been proposed by Gomes et al. in [19].2 The long term behavior
of solutions has also been studied by Cardaliaguet et al. for different classes of mean field games
(see [10, 11]). The convergence of games with a finite number of players towards mean field games
has also been an important research topic (see [18] in addition to already cited papers). Recently,
Carmona and Delarue proposed a very interesting probabilistic analysis of mean field games in [12]
and provided a comparison between controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics and mean field games in
[13].
In parallel with this first strand of research focussed on mean field game equations and their
properties, a literature emerged on numerical methods to approximate the solution of mean field
game equations. Achdou et al. proposed finite different schemes in [2, 3] to approximate the so-
lution of the coupled system of partial differential equations involved in mean field games. They
also consider the case of the planning problem where the terminal condition on the value function
is replaced by a terminal condition of the state distribution (see [1]). Gradient methods have been
proposed by Lachapelle et al. in [27] in the case of potential games. The case of mean field games
with quadratic Hamiltonian has also been considered, for which specific monotone numerical meth-
ods have been proposed in [22, 23].
The last part of the literature on mean field games is dedicated to applications. The first appli-
cations were shown in [20] and [25], mainly to economics. Other economic applications have been
considered since then and an important example is the paper by Lucas and Moll [34]. These two
economists indeed proposed a growth theory model based on mean field games. Chan and Sircar
proposed a competition model for oil producers using mean field game equations in [15]. Financial
applications are also present in the literature. For instance, Carmona et al. proposed a mean field
game model of systemic risk. Lachapelle et al. also proposed a stylized mean field game model to
understand price formation on financial markets. Finally, applications to population dynamics have
also been presented in papers on numerical methods (see also [28] for an example with congestion).
In the literature, mean field games have most often been considered on continuous state spaces.
As in [18], we consider in this paper the opposite case of a discrete state space. More precisely, we
consider mean field games on graphs and we do not focus on a particular structure for the graph,
that is for the possibility to go from one node to another. The discrete counterpart of the mean field
game partial differential equations are 2N ordinary differential equations, where N is the cardinal
of the state space (the number of nodes in the graph).
The goal of the paper is to provide existence and uniqueness of a solution to these G-MFG equa-
tions. As far as existence is concerned, our framework is very general and allows for almost any
local or non-local congestion effects. The result is obtained using a priori estimates and a Schauder
fixed point argument. Our result on uniqueness is more general than the discrete counterpart of any
existing result in the case of a continuous state space. The usual monotonicity property required
for games with no congestion effect (see [32]) is indeed generalized with the additional requirement
of a structural hypothesis on the Hamiltonian function of the problem, in order to deal with con-
gestion (see also [33] for another result on partial differential equations in the specific case of local
congestion).
In the first section, we introduce the framework and the hypotheses on the payoff and cost
functions. G-MFG equations are then introduced. In Section 2, we prove the existence of a C1
solution to G-MFG equations using a priori bounds obtained through a comparison principle and a
fixed point argument a` la Schauder. Section 3 is dedicated to our uniqueness result for the solutions
of G-MFG equations. Under additional smoothness assumptions for the Hamiltonian function and
using the same kind of method as the one proposed in [32, 33], we prove uniqueness under a
structural assumption on the Hamiltonian function.
2Gomes also studied discrete (in time) mean field games in [17].
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1 Mean field games on graphs
1.1 Notations
We consider a directed graph G whose nodes are indexed by integers from 1 to N . For each node
i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} we introduce V(i) ⊂ N \ {i} the set of nodes j for which a directed edge exists
from i to j. The cardinal of this set is denoted di and called the out-degree of the node i. Re-
ciprocally, we denote V−1(i) ⊂ N \{i} the set of nodes j for which a directed edge exists from j to i.
We suppose that there is a continuum of anonymous and identical players of size 1. At any time,
each player is located at a given node of the graph and hence G is the state space of our mean field
game.
The process modeling the position of each player is a Markov chain in continuous time. Instan-
taneous transition probabilities at time t are described by a collection of feedback control functions
λt(i, ·) : V(i) → R+ (for each node i ∈ N ). Throughout the text, we assume that the controls are
in the admissible set A defined by:
A =
{
(λt(i, j))t∈[0,T ],i∈N ,j∈V(i) deterministic |∀i ∈ N ,∀j ∈ V(i), t 7→ λt(i, j) ∈ L
∞(0, T )
}
,
where T > 0 is the final time of the game.
At the macroscopic level, the distribution of the players on the graph G is described by a func-
tion t 7→ m(t) = (m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)), where m(i, t) simply stands for the proportion of the total
population of players located at node i at time t.
At any time t, each player can pay a cost to choose the values of the transition probabilities.
We assume that the instantaneous cost of a player is given by L(i, (λi,j)j∈V(i),m(t)) if he is located
at node i and if he sets the value of λ(i, j) to λi,j (for all j ∈ V(i)).
At time t, each player also earns a certain instantaneous payoff from its position on the graph.
We denote f(i,m(t)) the instantaneous payoff of a player located at node i at time t.
Remark 1: We assume that the functions L(i, ·, ·) and f(i, ·) do not depend on t. Adding a time
dependence does not add technical difficulties.
At time T , each player has a terminal payoff depending on his position on the graph. We denote
g(i,m(T )) the terminal payoff of a player located at node i at time T .
The assumptions made on the functions L(i, ·, ·), f(i, ·) and g(i, ·) are the following:
• Continuity: ∀i ∈ N , the functions L(i, ·, ·) : Rdi+ × R
N
+ → R+, f(i, ·) : R
N
+ → R and
g(i, ·) : RN+ → R are continuous.
• Convexity of the cost functions: ∀i ∈ N ,∀µ ∈ RN+ ,L(i, ·, µ) is a strictly convex function.
• Asymptotic super-linearity of the cost functions:
∀i ∈ N ,∀K > 0, lim
λ∈R
di
+
,|λ|→+∞
inf
µ∈[0,K]N
L(i, λ, µ)
|λ|
= +∞.
Remark 2: as far as the variable µ is concerned, there is no real need to define the functions
outside of PN = {(µ1, . . . , µN ) ∈ R
N
+ ,
∑N
i=1 µi = 1} for our existence result. However, as we need to
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differentiate functions with respect to the each component of the state distribution for our unique-
ness result, we prefer to define functions on RN+ .
Associated to the cost functions L(i, ·, ·), we define the Hamiltonian functions H(i, ·, ·) by:
∀i ∈ N , (p, µ) ∈ Rdi × RN+ 7→ H(i, p, µ) = sup
λ∈R
di
+
λ · p−L(i, λ, µ).
We recall (see for instance [8]) that:
• ∀i ∈ N , H(i, ·, ·) is a continuous function.
• ∀i ∈ N ,∀µ ∈ RN+ , H(i, ·, µ) is a C
1 function and ∇pH(i, ·, ·) is a continuous function with:
∀p ∈ Rdi ,∀µ ∈ RN+ ,∇pH(i, p, µ) = argmaxλ∈Rdi
+
λ · p− L(i, λ, µ).
1.2 Mean field game equations
Following the notations introduced above, for a given admissible control3 λ ∈ A and a given
function m : t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ (m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) ∈ PN we define the intertemporal payoff function
Jm : [0, T ]×N ×A → R by:
Jm(i, t, λ) = E
[∫ T
t
(−L(Xs, λs(Xs, ·)) + f(Xs,m(s))) ds+ g (XT ,m(T ))
]
for (Xs)s∈[t,T ] a Markov chain on G, starting from i at time t, with instantaneous transition
probabilities given by (λs)s∈[t,T ].
From this, we can adapt the definition of a (symmetric) Nash-MFG equilibrium to our context:
Definition 1 (Nash-MFG symmetric equilibrium). A differentiable function m : t ∈ [0, T ] 7→
(m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) ∈ PN is said to be a Nash-MFG equilibrium, if there exists an admissible
control λ ∈ A such that:
∀λ˜ ∈ A,∀i ∈ N , Jm(i, 0, λ) ≥ Jm(i, 0, λ˜),
and
∀i ∈ N ,
d
dt
m(i, t) =
∑
j∈V−1(i)
λt(j, i)m(j, t) −
∑
j∈V(i)
λt(i, j)m(i, t)
In that case, λ is called an optimal control.
The first equation corresponds to the absence of profitable unilateral deviation for a player,
given a trajectory of the state distribution. The second equation is a coherence equation, stating
that the evolution of the state distribution is coherent with the choice of the agents.
Now, let us define the G-MFG equations associated to the above mean field game with an initial
distribution m0 ∈ PN :
Definition 2 (The G-MFG equations). The G-MFG equations consist in a system of 2N equations,
the unknown being t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ (u(1, t), . . . , u(N, t),m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)).
The first half of these equations are Hamilton-Jacobi equations and consist in the following
system:
∀i ∈ N ,
d
dt
u(i, t)+H
(
i, (u(j, t) − u(i, t))j∈V(i),m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)
)
+f(i,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) = 0
3We call λ a control although it is an abuse of terminology since the controls consist in the values of λ.
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with u(i, T ) = g(i,m(1, T ), . . . ,m(N,T )).
The second half of these equations are forward transport equations:
∀i ∈ N ,
d
dt
m(i, t) =
∑
j∈V−1(i)
∂H(j, ·,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t))
∂pi
(
(u(k, t) − u(j, t))k∈V(j)
)
m(j, t)
−
∑
j∈V(i)
∂H(i, ·,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t))
∂pj
(
(u(k, t) − u(i, t))k∈V(i)
)
m(i, t)
with (m(1, 0), . . . ,m(N, 0)) = m0.
As usual in the mean field game literature, u is the value function of players. In other words,
we expect to have u(i, t) = supλ∈A Jm(i, t, λ) for m solving the above equations.
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In what follows, existence and uniqueness of solutions to the G-MFG equations are studied. We
first start with existence and our proof is based on a Schauder fixed-point argument and a priori
estimates to obtain compactness. Then, we present a criterion to ensure uniqueness of C1 solutions.
2 Existence result
For the existence result, we first start with a lemma stating that, for a fixed m, the N Hamilton-
Jacobi equations amongst the G-MFG equations obey a comparison principle:
Lemma 1 (Comparison principle). Let m : [0, T ] → PN be a continuous function. Let u : t ∈
[0, T ] 7→ (u(1, t), . . . , u(N, t)) be a C1 function that verifies:
∀i ∈ N , −
d
dt
u(i, t)−H
(
i, (u(j, t) − u(i, t))j∈V(i),m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)
)
−f(i,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) ≤ 0
with u(i, T ) ≤ g(i,m(1, T ), . . . ,m(N,T )).
Let v : t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ (v(1, t), . . . , v(N, t)) be a C1 function that verifies:
∀i ∈ N , −
d
dt
v(i, t)−H
(
i, (v(j, t) − v(i, t))j∈V(i),m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)
)
−f(i,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) ≥ 0
with v(i, T ) ≥ g(i,m(1, T ), . . . ,m(N,T )).
Then, ∀i ∈ N ,∀t ∈ [0, T ], v(i, t) ≥ u(i, t).
Proof:
Let us consider for a given ǫ > 0, a point (i∗, t∗) ∈ [0, T ] ×N such that
u(i∗, t∗)− v(i∗, t∗)− ǫ(T − t∗) = max
(i,t)∈[0,T ]×N
u(i, t) − v(i, t) − ǫ(T − t)
If t∗ ∈ [0, T ), then d
dt
(u(i∗, t)− v(i∗, t)− ǫ(T − t))
∣∣
t=t∗
≤ 0. Also, by definition of (i∗, t∗),
∀j ∈ V(i∗), u(i∗, t∗)− v(i∗, t∗) ≥ u(j, t∗)− v(j, t∗) and hence, by definition of H(i∗, ·, ·):
H
(
i∗, (v(j, t∗)− v(i∗, t∗))j∈V(i∗),m(1, t
∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗)
)
4We do not prove any verification theorem. As we obtain a smooth solution in Theorem 1, there is in fact no technical
issue.
5
≥ H
(
i∗, (u(j, t∗)− u(i∗, t∗))j∈V(i∗),m(1, t
∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗)
)
Combining these inequalities we get:
−
d
dt
u(i∗, t∗)−H
(
i∗, (u(j, t∗)− u(i∗, t∗))j∈V(i∗),m(1, t
∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗)
)
−f(i∗,m(1, t∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗))
≥ −
d
dt
v(i∗, t∗)−H
(
i∗, (v(j, t∗)− v(i∗, t∗))j∈V(i∗),m(1, t
∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗)
)
−f(i∗,m(1, t∗), . . . ,m(N, t∗)) + ǫ
But this is in contradiction with the hypotheses on u and v.
Hence t∗ = T and max(i,t)∈[0,T ]×N u(i, t) − v(i, t) − ǫ(T − t) ≤ 0 because of the assumptions on
u(i, T ) and v(i, T ).
This being true for any ǫ > 0, we have that max(i,t)∈[0,T ]×N u(i, t)− v(i, t) ≤ 0.
This lemma allows to provide a bound to any solution u of the N Hamilton-Jacobi equations and
this bound is then used to obtain compactness in order to apply Schauder’s fixed point theorem.
Theorem 1 (Existence). Under the assumptions made in section 1, there exists a C1 solution
(u,m) of the G-MFG equations.
Proof:
Let m : [0, T ]→ PN be a continuous function.
Let then consider the solution u : t ∈ [0, T ] 7→ (u(1, t), . . . , u(N, t)) to the Hamilton-Jacobi
equations:
∀i ∈ N ,
d
dt
u(i, t)+H
(
i, (u(j, t) − u(i, t))j∈V(i),m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)
)
+f(i,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)) = 0
with u(i, T ) = g(i,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t)).
This function u is a well defined C1 function with the following bound coming from the above
lemma:
sup
i∈N
‖u(i, ·)‖∞ ≤ sup
i∈N
‖g(i, ·)‖∞ + T sup
i∈N ,µ∈PN
|H(i, 0, µ)| + T sup
i∈N ,µ∈PN
|f(i, µ)|.
Using this bound and the properties on H, we can define a function m˜ : [0, T ]→ PN by:
∀i ∈ N ,
d
dt
m˜(i, t) =
∑
j∈V−1(i)
∂H(j, ·,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t))
∂pi
(
(u(k, t) − u(j, t))k∈V(j)
)
m˜(j, t)
−
∑
j∈V(i)
∂H(i, ·,m(1, t), . . . ,m(N, t))
∂pj
(
(u(k, t) − u(i, t))k∈V(i)
)
m˜(i, t)
with (m˜(0, 1), . . . , m˜(0, N)) = m0 ∈ PN .
dm˜
dt
is bounded, the bounds depending only on the functions f(i, ·), g(i, ·) and H(i, ·, ·), i ∈ N .
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As a consequence, if we define Θ : m ∈ C([0, T ],PN ) 7→ m˜ ∈ C([0, T ],PN ), Θ is a continuous
function (from classical ODE theory) with Θ(C([0, T ],PN )) a relatively compact set (because of
Ascoli’s Theorem and the uniform Lipschitz property we just obtained).
Hence, because C([0, T ],PN ) is convex, by Schauder’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed
point m to Θ. If we then consider u associated to m by the Hamilton-Jacobi equations as above,
(u,m) is a C1 solution to the G-MFG equations.
3 Uniqueness
Coming now to uniqueness, we use similar ideas as those used in [31, 32] or [33] in the case of PDEs
to obtain a criterion close to the one obtained in [33] but adapted to graphs and generalized to
non-local congestion.
Before stating the theorem, let us introduce a few notations. Mr,c is the set of real matrices
with r rows and c columns. In the particular case of square matrices,Mr,r is denotedMr. We also
say the a square matrix M ∈ Mr is positive, and we write M ≥ 0, if ∀y ∈ R
r, y′My ≥ 0 where y′
denotes the transpose of y.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). Assume that g is such that:
∀(ν, µ) ∈ PN × PN ,
N∑
i=1
(g(i, ν1, . . . , νN )− g(i, µ1, . . . , µN ))(νi − µi) ≥ 0 =⇒ ν = µ.
Assume that f is such that:
∀(ν, µ) ∈ PN × PN ,
N∑
i=1
(f(i, ν1, . . . , νN )− f(i, µ1, . . . , µN ))(νi − µi) ≥ 0 =⇒ ν = µ
Assume that H is such that ∀i ∈ N ,∀j ∈ V(i), ∂H
∂pj
(i, ·, ·) is a C1 function on Rdi × RN+ .
Let us define A : (q1, . . . , qN , µ) ∈
∏N
i=1 R
di × PN 7→ (αij(qi, µ))i,j ∈ MN defined by:
αij(qi, µ) = −
∂H
∂µj
(i, qi, µ).
Let us also define, ∀i ∈ N , Bi : (qi, µ) ∈ R
di ×PN 7→
(
βijk(qi, µ)
)
j,k
∈ MN,di defined by:
βijk(qi, µ) =
µi
2
∂2H
∂µj∂qik
(i, qi, µ).
Let us also define, ∀i ∈ N , Ci : (qi, µ) ∈ R
di × PN 7→
(
γijk(qi, µ)
)
j,k
∈Mdi,N defined by:
γijk(qi, µ) =
µi
2
∂2H
∂µk∂qij
(i, qi, µ).
Let us finally define, ∀i ∈ N , Di : (qi, µ) ∈ R
di × PN 7→
(
δijk(qi, µ)
)
j,k
∈ Mdi defined by:
δijk(qi, µ) = µi
∂2H
∂qij∂qik
(i, qi, µ).
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Assume that ∀(q1, . . . , qN , µ) ∈
∏N
i=1 R
di × PN :
M(q1, . . . , qN , µ) =

A(q1, . . . , qN , µ) B
1(q1, µ) · · · · · · · · · B
N (qN , µ)
C1(q1, µ) D
1(q1, µ) 0 · · · · · · 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
CN (qN , µ) 0 · · · · · · 0 D
N (qN , µ)

≥ 0.
Then, if (û, m̂) and (u˜, m˜) are two C1 solutions of the G-MFG equations, we have m̂ = m˜ and
û = u˜.
Proof:
The proof of this result consists in computing in two different ways the value of
I =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
d
dt
((û(i, t) − u˜(i, t))(m̂(i, t)− m˜(i, t))) dt.
We first know directly that
I =
N∑
i=1
(g(i, m̂(T ))− g(i, m˜(T )))(m̂(i, T )− m˜(i, T )).
Now, differentiating the product we get:
I = −
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(f(i, m̂(t))− f(i, m˜(t)))(m̂(i, t) − m˜(i, t))dt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(m̂(i, t)− m˜(i, t))
[
H(i, (u˜(k, t)−u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t))−H(i, (û(k, t)−û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t))
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(û(i, t) − u˜(i, t))
[ ∑
j∈V−1(i)
H
∂pi
(j, (û(k, t)− û(j, t))k∈V(j), m̂(t))m̂(j, t)
−
∑
j∈V(i)
H
∂pj
(i, (û(k, t)−û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t))m̂(i, t)−
∑
j∈V−1(i)
H
∂pi
(j, (u˜(k, t)−u˜(j, t))k∈V(j), m˜(t))m˜(j, t)
+
∑
j∈V(i)
H
∂pj
(i, (u˜(k, t)− u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t))m˜(i, t)
]
dt.
After reordering the terms we get:
I = −
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(f(i, m̂(t))− f(i, m˜(t)))(m̂(i, t) − m˜(i, t))dt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(m̂(i, t)− m˜(i, t))
[
H(i, (u˜(k, t)−u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t))−H(i, (û(k, t)−û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t))
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
m̂(i, t)
∑
j∈V(i)
((û(j, t) − u˜(j, t)) − (û(i, t)− u˜(i, t)))
∂H
∂pj
(
i, (û(k, t)− û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t)
)
dt
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−∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
m˜(i, t)
∑
j∈V(i)
((û(j, t) − u˜(j, t)) − (û(i, t) − u˜(i, t)))
∂H
∂pj
(
i, (u˜(k, t)− u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t)
)
dt,
i.e.:
I = −
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(f(i, m̂(t))− f(i, m˜(t)))(m̂(i, t)− m˜(i, t))dt + J,
where
J =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(m̂(i, t) − m˜(i, t))
[
H(i, (u˜(k, t)−u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t))−H(i, (û(k, t)−û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t))
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈V(i)
((û(j, t) − u˜(j, t)) − (û(i, t) − u˜(i, t)))
[
m̂(i, t)
∂H
∂pj
(
i, (û(k, t) − û(i, t))k∈V(i), m̂(t)
)
−m˜(i, t)
∂H
∂pj
(
i, (u˜(k, t) − u˜(i, t))k∈V(i), m˜(t)
) ]
dt.
Now, if we denote uθ(t) = u˜(t) + θ(û(t) − u˜(t)) and mθ(t) = m˜(t) + θ(m̂(t) − m˜(t)), then we
have:
J =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(m̂(i, t) − m˜(i, t))
∫ 1
0
[ ∑
j∈V(i)
−
∂H
∂pj
(i, (uθ(k, t)− uθ(i, t))k∈V(i),m
θ(t))
×((û(j, t)−u˜(j, t))−(û(i, t)−u˜(i, t)))+
N∑
j=1
−
∂H
∂µj
(i, (uθ(k, t)−uθ(i, t))k∈V(i),m
θ(t))(m̂(j, t)−m˜(j, t))
]
dθdt
+
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈V(i)
∫ 1
0
[
(m̂(i, t)− m˜(i, t))
∂H
∂pj
(
i, (uθ(k, t)− uθ(i, t))k∈V(i),m
θ(t)
)
+mθ(i, t)
∑
l∈V(i)
((û(l, t)− u˜(l, t)) − (û(i, t)− u˜(i, t)))
∂2H
∂pl∂pj
(
i, (uθ(k, t)− uθ(i, t))k∈V(i),m
θ(t)
)
+mθ(i, t)
N∑
l=1
(m̂(l, t)− m˜(l, t))
∂2H
∂µl∂pj
(
i, (uθ(k, t)− uθ(i, t))k∈V(i),m
θ(t)
)]
dθ
×((û(j, t) − u˜(j, t)) − (û(i, t)− u˜(i, t)))dt.
We see that the first group of terms cancels with the third one and we can write J as:
J =
∫ T
0
∫ 1
0
V (t)M((uθ(k, t) − uθ(1, t))k∈V(1), . . . , (u
θ(k, t)− uθ(N, t))k∈V(N),m
θ(t))V (t)′dθdt,
where
V (t) = (m̂(t)− m˜(t), ((û(k, t) − u˜(k, t))− (û(1, t)− u˜(1, t)))k∈V(1), . . . ,
((û(k, t) − u˜(k, t))− (û(N, t)− u˜(N, t)))k∈V(N)).
Hence J ≥ 0 and we have:∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(f(i, m̂(t))− f(i, m˜(t)))(m̂(i, t) − m˜(i, t))dt
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+
N∑
i=1
(g(i, m̂(T ))− g(i, m˜(T )))(m̂(i, T )− m˜(i, T )) ≥ 0.
Using the hypotheses on f and g we get m̂ = m˜.
The comparison principle stated in Lemma 1 then brings û = u˜ and the result is proved.
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